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This joint applied research project analyzed the performance of the United States Navy 
while operating in a Joint Task Force during recent humanitarian assistance and disaster 
relief missions. The performance of the USN during these missions was measured by 
comparing the regulations, procedures, and stated goals for these missions against 
interviews of firsthand accounts and a literature review documenting the Navy’s role 
during recent HADR missions. This project was not intended to determine if the actions 
taken during recent HADR missions were the right actions to take or if the results could 
have been better given alternative actions. Rather, the assessment focused solely on 
determining if the actions on the ground differed from the published doctrine. The 
recommendations for this project focused on how leaders appointed to conduct HADR 
missions may better align their actions on the ground against the stated goals for the 
mission, and, recommendations for updating current instructions and procedures to better 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The intent of this joint applied research project is to analyze the performance of 
the United States Navy (USN) or joint command when operating using Navy assets in 
recent humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) missions against the stated 
goals for such missions. The stated goals are determined from instructions, regulations, 
statements and speeches made by top Navy and military leadership. The performance of 
the USN during these missions will be measured using comparison between regulations, 
procedures, and stated goals against interviews of firsthand accounts and a literature 
review documenting the Navy’s role during recent HADR missions. 
In 2010, President Barak Obama signed the latest National Security Strategy 
(NSS), which among other things called for a greater emphasis to be placed on HADR by 
the United States government (USG). Specifically, in the NSS the president states: 
Together with the American people and the international community, we 
will continue to respond to humanitarian crises to ensure that those in need 
have the protection and assistance they need. ... The United States must be 
better prepared and resourced to exercise robust leadership to help meet 
critical humanitarian needs. (White House, 2010)  
This increased NSS emphasis on HADR is in great contrast to previous NSSs released by 
former presidents. In the past, presidents have acknowledged the need for HADR as a 
soft power tool for national security but did not make it a priority for the USG as 
President Obama has. A result has been to rely heavily on the Department of Defense 
(DOD) to support the Department of State (DoS) and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) in their role as lead agency for all foreign disaster responses by 
the USG (White House, 2010).  
The role of the U.S. Navy in HADR has been extremely valuable to the USG in 
their strategic objective of delivering aid and assistance after a disaster. The Navy has the 
ability to project soft power through its unique and far reaching logistical capabilities. 
The Navy’s role in HADR can range from a single flight of supplies to a full battle 
 2 
group’s deployment with an amphibious landing of Marines onto any littoral in the world. 
In keeping with the National Security Strategy, whatever capacity the U.S. Navy is called 
upon to support HADR efforts, it has now made the mission of HADR a priority.  
The HADR mission set is a non-traditional mission for the military that has 
sometimes been seen by senior military leaders as simply a tool for the DoS (Maj. B. 
Rosario, U.S. Air Force [USAF], personal communication, September 24, 2014). During 
large scale HADR operations, the capabilities of commercial transportation and logistics 
services relied on by the DoS, are often overwhelmed and severely limited. Therefore, the 
DoS often requests assistance from the DOD for these services. In doing so, the DOD 
becomes an extension of the DoS for the purposes of the HADR mission (Department of 
Defense, 2011). 
Within the past decade the quantity of natural disasters requiring the assistance of 
the DOD has increased, and it is projected to continue to increase into the near future 
(United Nations, 2009). Despite the increased reliance on the DOD, and more specifically 
the Department of Navy (DoN), for a mission set they are not traditionally designed to 
accomplish, the DoN and the DOD have been very successful according to military and 
civilian leaders (Roughead, 2010). 
Despite the praise by military leaders as to the success of previous military 
HADR missions there have been several reports that point out areas for improvement. 
These reports have come from within the military as well as from other governmental 
agencies and from non-governmental organizations (NGO). However, to accurately 
determine if the previous HADR missions met their stated goals would require an 
analysis of the missions themselves and the regulations that govern the DOD and DoNs 
implementation of HADR missions and then analysis of the delta between them. This 
joint applied research project will address the analysis of the delta and provide 
recommendations for how to correct or approve upon the findings of the analysis.  
B. BACKGROUND 
The USGs HADR mission set has been mandated by public law since 1961 with 
the passing of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA). The FAA shaped the scope of 
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the mission for the DOD and the USN. The passing of the FAA called for the 
development of a new governmental agency to administer the foreign assistance provided 
by the USG. The agency created was the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID). USAID is directed by FAA to take on the lead role in all foreign 
assistance from the USG and reports directly to the President and the Secretary of State 
on all matters relating to the USG response to HADR missions. The USAID works in 
concert with the DoS to conduct operations around the globe that the President has 
determined to require assistance from the USG. USAID can request support from other 
governmental agencies, such as Defense, State or FEMA as needed to accomplish their 
mission (U.S. Agency for International Development, 2005).  
The needs of the effected people in an area following a natural disaster or other 
major trauma, such as war, often cannot be fully met with commercial means. 
Specifically, additional help if often needed in cases of, large scale logistical 
requirements, mass causalities in remote areas, or severely damaged or limited 
transportation infrastructure in the affected area. When USAID is unable to complete its 
mandated mission due to a lack of commercial support or the commercial sector being 
overwhelmed by the heavy demands, the agency would then call upon the DOD for 
assistance (U.S. Agency for International Development, 2005).  
The DOD is uniquely capable to operate under conditions that severely limit 
traditional modes of transportation or logistics channels (Department of Defense, 2011). 
The DoN is specifically suited to operate in these conditions when they occur within 
range of the ocean. Within days of receiving orders from the Secretary of Defense 
(SecDef) the USN can have air capable ships off the coast of a country affected by 
natural disaster. Those aircraft can then immediately begin ferrying supplies such as 
water, food, or medical equipment to the displaced population. Within a week the DoN 
can have an entire battle group consisting of a carrier strike group (CSG) and an 
amphibious ready group (ARG) off the coast of an effected country (Department of 
Defense, 2011). These assets can provide any assistance the host nation needs and do so 
through self-sustainment and little or no outside assistance.  
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In a joint environment, when the DOD is conducting HADR missions, internal 
infrastructure such as roads and airports are often unusable. The Navy is capable of fully 
sustaining the operation from sea. Just as in combat operations once the Navy has made 
entry ashore, it is able to maintain open lines of communications from the sea through 
amphibious landings, port reconstruction and air capable ships. These modes of 
transportation into an effected country may be the only mode to bring in needed relief 
supplies (Department of Defense, 2011). 
The ability to maintain open lines of communication from the sea provide the 
mission commander, and ultimately USAID, with the ability to resupply and sustain the 
force ashore. This is the critical element the Navy brings to bear and is the difference 
between the Navy and other governmental agencies and NGOs. Without the long-term 
sustainment efforts provided by the Navy, the relief efforts would be contingent upon the 
local infrastructure for logistics and support. In past HADR missions, both airports and 
seaports have been rendered inoperable. Without a logistics chain to sustain relief efforts, 
the human suffering could have been far greater.  
C. SCOPE 
The scope of this research project is limited to analysis of the actual performance 
of the USN or joint command when operating using Navy assets in recent HADR 
missions against the stated goals for such missions. The stated goals are determined from 
instructions, regulations, statements and speeches made by top Navy and military 
leadership. The performance of the USN during these missions will be measured using 
comparison between regulations, procedures, and stated goals against interviews of 
firsthand accounts and a literature review documenting the Navy’s role during recent 
HADR missions.  
This project is not intended to determine if the actions taken during recent HADR 
missions were the right actions to take or if the results could have been better given 
alternative actions. Rather, the assessment will focus solely on determining if differences 
between the written and stated goals and actions on the ground exist. The 
recommendations for this project focus on how leaders appointed to conduct HADR 
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missions may better align their actions on the ground against the stated goals for the 
mission, and, recommendations for updating current instructions and procedures to better 
align the written stated goals with the best practices observed on the ground during recent 
HADR missions. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology for this research project utilized a thorough literature review to 
determine the governing doctrine for USG conducting HADR missions. The literature 
review will serve as the bases for the stated goals for recent HADR missions which were 
then analyzed against the first-hand accounts through interviews with individuals in key 
HADR positions.  
1. Literature Review 
The primary question of this research project is what Navy policies and or 
procedures should change to better meet the stated Navy HADR goals? To answer this 
question, the researcher conducted a thorough review of current literature of HADR 
operations involving the USG and the requirements set forth in law governing this type of 
operation. The data collected from the literature review included federal law that 
specifically grants the USG the ability to perform assistance to foreign nations. Also 
included are the requirements for the interaction between governmental agencies charged 
with conducting HADR missions. Based on the broad requirements covering HADR the 
researcher determined each governmental agency’s specific requirements and regulations 
for how they conduct HADR missions. 
To answer the primary research question, two secondary questions must be 
addressed. 1. What are the stated goals of the Navy’s Humanitarian Assistance and 
Disaster Relief (HADR) Program? 2. Were the Navy’s goals met during the previous 
HADR missions? 
2. Data Collection 
Once a thorough review of the literature for HADR was completed, the researcher 
examined the after action reports and literature about previous HADR missions from both 
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the perspective of the USG and from non-governmental organizations who recently 
participated in HADR missions. The key to this review were the interviews with 
governmental and non-governmental organizations to gain specific details about the 
missions they recently conducted for comparison against stated goals. 
3. Delta Analysis 
The difference between the stated goals and requirements of the literature review 
and the actual events on the ground of recent HADR missions were then analyzed. 
Identifying this delta between the stated requirement and the actual outcome is the focus 
of this research paper. Based on the findings the researcher then provided 
recommendations for how to possibly reduce or eliminate this delta while retaining or 
increasing performance in areas where goals are currently being met. 
4. Summary 
This joint applied research project intends to analyze the performance of the USN 
or joint command when operating using U.S. Navy assets in recent HADR missions 
against the stated goals for such missions. The stated goals are determined from 
instructions, regulations, statements and speeches made by top Navy and military 
leadership. This research was conducted with a thorough literature review of recently 
documented HADR missions involving the U.S. Navy or Joint Command from several 
perspectives. The literature review was the basis for determining the stated goals for the 
HADR missions. This basis will then be compared and contrasted to firsthand accounts 
by individuals who participated in recent HADR missions. These firsthand accounts were 
collected through interviews with members of the Combatant Commands Planning staff, 
personnel working with USAID, a military liaison officer embedded with USAID and a 
not-for-profit non-governmental organization. The delta between the stated goals for 
HADR missions and the actual results was analyzed to determine areas where 
improvements can be made in policy and training. The review also demonstrated areas 
where great improvements have already been realized. This research project concludes 
with the researcher’s recommendations for how to better meet stated HADR mission 
goals in the future.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
The foundation of this joint applied project is the analysis of current literature in 
the field of HADR. The focus of this literature review is broken down into three parts. 
First, federal government and DOD instructions governing the planning and execution of 
HADR missions within the scope of the USN. This can include instructions, publications, 
directives, statements and speeches by DOD and civilian leadership. Second, the lessons 
learned and after action reports from a USN and DOD perspective following past HADR 
missions that utilized naval assets in the planning and execution of the mission. Third, the 
lessons learned and after action reports and various publications reporting on the non-
military perspective following past HADR missions. 
Throughout the literature there are several terms used referring to HADR 
missions. Even within the DOD there is little consistency with the term and even the 
definitions. Some examples of terms used are foreign assistance, foreign disaster, foreign 
disaster assistance, foreign disaster relief, Foreign humanitarian assistance, humanitarian 
and other assistance, foreign disaster relief operations and reconstruction and stabilization 
operations. For simplicity throughout this paper, I will use the term HADR to cover all 
terms identified. The definition I will use comes from a combination of definitions found 
in the Department of Defense Instruction 5100.46 (Department of Defense, 2012b) and 
Joint Publication 1-02 (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2010); 
Department of Defense activities, normally in support of the United States 
Agency for International Development or Department of State, conducted 
outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. This includes 
assistance that can be used immediately to alleviate the suffering of 
foreign disaster victims. Normally, it includes services and commodities 
as well as the rescue and evacuation of victims; the provision and 
transportation of food, water, clothing, medicines, beds, and bedding, 
temporary shelter, the furnishing of medical equipment, medical and 
technical personnel; and making repairs to essential services. (Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, 2010; Department of Defense, 2012b). 
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B. NATIONAL POLICY 
The national policy, or national doctrine, is determined through a cascading of 
regulations originating with the president. The president sets his national priorities and 
overarching strategy for the country for which all governmental agencies are to follow.  
1. National Security Strategy 
All Navy instructions and regulations stem from the strategy, planning and 
resourcing process (SPRP). The SPRP derives the president’s strategic plan for the nation 
through the National Security Strategy (NSS) (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011a). The NSS is 
the “ends” the president envisions for the national strategy and protection of the 
homeland. From this document the SecDef interprets the president’s strategy and derives 
the “ways” in which the DOD will accomplish that strategy and lays out this vision in the 
National Defense Strategy (NDS). From that document the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff (CJCS) must then demonstrate the “means” for achieving the strategy by 
outlining the DODs strategic direction in the National Military Strategy (NMS) (Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2011a). From this document the military departments develop doctrine 
which directly updates instructions, procedures and regulations for how the services 
operate (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011a).  
The National Defense Strategy (NDS) signed by the SecDef is the DODs plan for 
carrying out the requirements outlined in the president’s NSS. In the “Ends, Ways, and 
Means construct,” the NDS is the ways. In the NDS the DOD identifies military 
objectives to focus on which the SecDef feels will best meet the NSS requirements. 
These military objectives then feed into the National Military Strategy (Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2011a). 
The National Military Strategy (NMS), signed by the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), is the plan for how the DOD will accomplish the military 
objectives called out in the NDS based on the NSS. In the “Ends, Ways, and Means 
construct,” the NMS is the means. The NMS identifies the resources necessary to achieve 
the assigned military objectives and the forces needed to defeat future threats to national 
security (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011a). 
From the NMS, the military is able to create or update their doctrine which 
governs all missions including HADR missions. Specifically, the Joint Publications have 
been updated with greater emphasis on HADR planning and execution. In addition there 
are new publications which solely address HADR (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011a).   
2. Joint Publications 
The Joint Publications are a series of six references created by the military and 
approved by the CJCS. They represent the current military doctrine for joint operations.  
Joint doctrine presents fundamental principles that guide the employment of U.S. 
military forces in coordinated and integrated action toward a common objective. It 
promotes a common perspective from which to plan, train, and conduct military 
operations. It represents what is taught, believed, and advocated as what is right (i.e., 
what works best). It provides distilled insights and wisdom gained from employing the 
military instrument of national power in operations to achieve national objectives (Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2010). 
The six Joint Publication volumes: 
1. JP 1-0 Personnel Series 
2. JP 2-0 Intelligence Series 
3. JP 3-0 Operations Series 
4. JP 4-0 Logistics Series 
5. JP 5-0 Planning Series 
6. JP 6-0 Communication Series 
Each of these Joint Publications is further broken down into sub-parts containing 
the military doctrine on specific mission sets within the series header. For example under 
JP 3-0 the military doctrine for joint operations there is the operations doctrine for foreign 
humanitarian assistance in JP 3-29. The GCC planner and the operational commander use 




3. Public Law 
Under current law the DOD can only participate in HADR missions when one of 
three requirements are met: 1. When directed by the President of the United States, 2. 
With the concurrence of the Secretary of State, or 3. In emergency situations in order to 
save human lives, when there is not sufficient time to seek the prior initial concurrence of 
the Secretary of State, in which case the Secretary of Defense shall advise, and seek 
concurrence of, the Secretary of State as soon as practicable thereafter (Executive order 
12966, 1995). 
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Public Law 87-195) (FAA) was signed into 
law by President John F. Kennedy for the purpose of establishing guidance on how the 
USG will provide assistance to friendly foreign nations. The FAA provides for the 
establishment of a new government agency who’s mandate is to direct all actions of the 
USG in the assistance of foreign nations. The new agency was the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID). USAID falls under the Secretary of State and is 
responsible for the USG response to any HADR contingency directed by the President 
(Foreign Assistance Act, 1961). 
When directed by the president or requested by the secretary of state, the DOD 
may conduct HADR missions under the direction of USAID. USAID is the lead agency 
in concert with the DoS when multiagency HADR missions are conducted. One 
exception would be when HADR missions are being conducted in concert with combat 
operations. In this situation the DOD retains the responsibility as the lead agency for the 
combat operation and security requirements. However, once combat operations are 
concluded and the theater security permits, SecDef and SecState will coordinate with 
each other to determine the lead agency moving forward with the HADR mission (White 
House, 2005). 
The USN assumes a supporting role under USAID for HADR missions. This 
construct is far different from what the USN is used to in normal combat operations. The 
need to understand this supporting role and to seek guidance from an outside agency can 
often be difficult. 
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4. International Agreements 
When U.S. forces are operating in a host nation they are often under the 
jurisdiction of the US government not the host nation. This is possible through the use of 
a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the host nation. By establishing a SOFA with 
a host nation they agree upon the framework under which the armed forces will operate 
while in the host nation. When conducting HADR missions within a host nation the 
SOFA provides protections for the U.S. forces operating there. Without these protections 
the ability for the military to move freely and conduct their mission will be severely 
curtailed (Department of Defense, 2011). 
In addition, a SOFA provides U.S. licensed medical personal the ability to 
practice medicine in the host country and provide needed medical assistance during a 
HADR mission. If there is not a SOFA in place the USG must establish an agreement 
with the host nation prior to conducting operations (Department of Defense, 2011). 
C. MILITARY POST-HADR ASSESSMENTS 
The following section summarizes recent HADR missions from the perspective of 
the U.S. military. The data presented is derived from mission after action reports, lessons 
learned and various military publications.  
1. Recent HADR Missions 
Despite the frequency at which the USG conducts this type of operation the 
availability of data needed for this type of research is often lacking. Due to this 
constraint, the researcher focused on two major HADR events which gained worldwide 
attention, the Haiti earthquake in 2010 and the Kashmir, Pakistan Earthquake in 2005. As 
a result of the attention given to these HADR operations and the magnitude of the 
operations the availability of data was adequate to understanding the events which took 
place before, during and after the operation by the USG.  
 12 
a. Haiti Earthquake 2010 
On January 12, 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake hit the small Caribbean island 
of Hispaniola from the Blind Thrust Fault. The island of Hispaniola is shared by two 
countries Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The epicenter of the earthquake hit near the 
capital city of Haiti, Port-au-Prince. The extent of the devastation left the island with up 
to 230,000 dead and all major infrastructure in ruin.  
The internal relief efforts were initially delayed due to the entire communications 
infrastructure being destroyed and all air, sea and land transportation infrastructure 
disabled. The local government was severely hit when most of the municipal buildings 
were destroyed during the quake. This left the government incapable of leading the relief 
efforts during the days after the earthquake.  
Calls for assistance came quickly from the government of Haiti to the 
international community. However, the international community had already been on the 
island before the quake. The group Doctors without Borders had been operating in the 
capital city Port-au-Prince for years. On the day of the earthquake, the hospital it had 
been working out of collapsed and killed many people inside. Other aid groups had also 
been operating in Haiti before the quake only to find all their buildings and equipment 
destroyed leaving them incapable to assist in the relief efforts. On the eastern side of the 
island the Dominican Republic quickly moved its troops to the border to prevent a mass 
migration of Haitians seeking refuge from the earthquake. The Dominican Republic 
allowed a limited number of injured Haitians access to their hospitals but insisted they 
could only stay a short time before being returned to Haiti. 
(1) United States Government Response 
On January 12, 2010, President Obama received a request for assistance from the 
Haitian government. President Obama immediately responded by stating,  
…at this moment, we are moving forward with one of the largest relief 
efforts in our history—to save lives and to deliver relief that averts an 
even larger catastrophe. In these difficult hours, America stands united. 
We stand united with the people of Haiti, who have shown such incredible 
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resilience, and we will help them to recover and to rebuild. (The White 
House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2010)   
From this the president directed the federal government to work with the international 
community and provide the needed assistance to Haiti.  
In accordance with the FAA, USAID took the lead as the head agency for the 
USG and coordinating body for all actions for the HADR efforts in Haiti. Understanding 
the extremely large scale of operations USAID immediately turned to the DOD for 
assistance. The SecDef then appointed Commander United States Southern Command 
under General Fraser to head the HADR mission in Haiti titled Operation Unified 
Response. General Fraser established Commander Joint Task Force—Haiti (CJTF-H) to 
take command of the response. The USG command structure for the Haiti earthquake 
response is demonstrated in Figure 1.  
  
Figure 1.  CJTF-Haiti Command Structure (from Ferguson, 2010) 
The bulk of the HADR response fell upon CJTF-41 under RDML Branch. The 
command structure for JTF-41 is demonstrated in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2.  CTF-41 Chain of Command (from Ferguson, 2010) 
The naval assets used in Operation Unified Response are listed in Table 1 by their 
unit name, unit designator and command hierarchy.  
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Table 1.   Naval forces used in Operation Unified Response (from Ferguson, 
2010) 
 
The DODs response to the earthquake relief efforts through Operation Unified 
Response included 22,268 U.S. military personnel from all branches and over 6,200 DOD 
civilians (United States Southern Command, 2010). This included 23 Navy ships, 10 
Coast Guard ships, 264 fixed wing aircraft, 57 helicopters, 2.6 million liters of water, 2.9 
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million meals served, 17 million pounds of bulk food delivered, 2.7 million meals-ready-
to-eat (MRE) delivered, 73,300 emergency radios distributed, 1.17 million people 
provided with emergency shelter, supported 16 World Food Program distribution points, 
343 medical evacuations, 1,025 surgeries performed, 9,758 people patients treated and 
seaport and airport reconstruction and operations (United States Southern Command, 
2010). These operations were conducted in concert with 147 other nations either directly 
or indirectly supporting the relief efforts (United States Southern Command, 2010). 
Total Navy assets used in CJTF-H included the following: 
 1 nuclear aircraft carrier (CVN) 
 1 carrier air wing (CAW) 
 1 guided missile destroyer (DDG) 
 2 guided missile cruisers (CG) 
 1 guided missile frigate (FFG) 
 4 dock landing ships (LSD) 
 1 landing helicopter assault ship (LHA) 
 1 landing platform dock ship (LPD) 
 1 landing helicopter dock (LHD) 
 1 fast sea frame ship (FSF)  
 2 marine expeditionary units (MEU) 
 1 mobile diving and salvage unit (MDSU) 
 1 fleet survey team (FST) 
 1 underwater construction team (UCT) 
 1 Navy mobile construction battalion (NMCB)  
 6 MSC ships (USNS) 
b. Kashmir, Pakistan Earthquake 2005 
In the early morning of October 8, 2005, approximately 700 miles from the 
Arabian Sea, deep in the interior of Pakistan, a 7.6 magnitude earthquake struck. The end 
result of the earthquake left over 100,000 people dead, over 138,000 people seriously 
injured and approximately 3.5 million people displaced. Despite being in a region known 
for large earthquakes the Pakistan government failed to adequately enforce building 
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codes which directly led to the incredibly large number of dead and injured. The majority 
of deaths were the result of building collapses. The construction widely used in the 
region, which was vulnerable to earthquakes, was primarily made of mud brick with 
mortar and wood supports.  
(1) U.S. Government Response 
Shortly after the earthquake the president of Pakistan, President Musharraf made a 
formal request for assistance to the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Ambassador Crocker. 
The response from the USG was swift and massive. Within 24 hours there were two US 
helicopters, previously conducting combat operations in Afghanistan, delivering relief 
supplies within Pakistan. The SecDef directed Combined Joint Task Force—76 (CJTF 
76) to lead the operations in Pakistan. CJTF-76 was already conducting combat and 
humanitarian operations in Afghanistan when the earthquake struck allowing them to 
respond very quickly. The Commander for CJTF-76 formed the Combined Disaster 
Assistance Center—Pakistan (CDAD-Pak) to coordinate relief efforts for the USG. In 
concert with USAID and the Ambassador the DOD conducted operations under the 
direction of the Pakistani military. With the Pakistani military as the lead agency the 
USG derived their goals from them. Specifically, the goals were to restore livelihoods, 
resumption of schooling for children, and the re-opening of roads. In helping to 
rehabilitate and reconstruct the affected areas, the international community would change 
the lives of the survivors. The USG goals for the operation, in addition to the above, were 
strengthening democracy and promoting peace between India and Pakistan (Pakistan 
Earthquake, 2005). 
The USG pledged $300 million in relief and reconstruction assistance, $110 
million in transportation and military support, and $100 million in private sector 
donations (Pakistan Earthquake, 2005). The Naval assets involved in the HADR efforts 
were two amphibious ships the USS Cleveland (LPD-7) and the USS Pearl Harbor 
(LSD-52), a Naval Mobile Construction Battalion, an ARG and 24 MH-60 helicopters.  
The USGs HADR response in Pakistan was much smaller than the USGs response 
to the Haiti earthquake. This is in part to the distance to the U.S. and due to the 
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continuing combat and humanitarian operations ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
However, the DOD HADR efforts far exceeded of the efforts of any other country.  
D. NON-MILITARY POST-HADR ASSESSMENT 
As events occur around the world the first organizations often to provide 
assistance are NGOs. In addition, after most foreign nations pull their military aid 
following a HADR mission it is the NGOs who remain behind to continue the work of 
long-term development. The following section is an account of the contributions provided 
by NGOs during the 2010 Haiti earthquake and the 2005 Pakistan earthquake.  
1. 2010 Haiti Earthquake 
After the 2010 earthquake in Haiti NGOs flocked to Haiti in an attempt to serve 
the injured and displaced population. As of the date of this project 49 NGOs had spent 
over $4.5 billion on the relief efforts in Haiti (Holden, 2011; Interaction, 2014). The 
majority of services rendered by NGOs include medical equipment and services, 
construction equipment and services, food, water, and temporary shelter. The NGOs 
reported record fund raising immediately following the earthquake but held off spending 
until years later. The reason for this delay is in the NGOs stated purpose of long-term 
sustained support (Interaction, 2014). The bulk of funds raised by NGOs were earmarked 
for future construction efforts. This is in comparison to the U.S. military’s plan of a quick 
reaction rescue mission with maximum up-front support based on a short-term in country 
time line.  
2. 2005 Pakistan Earthquake 
The 2005 earthquake in Pakistan proved to be a very difficult operation for many 
NGOs. The terrain and weather prevented most sources of relief efforts. Without the lift 
capabilities of the military the ability to reach the displaced population was impossible. 
Many of the NGOs in Pakistan partnered with various military to transport their people 
and supplies to the affected areas. At the peak of the HADR operations on Pakistan there 
were 13 international NGOs operating (Wilder, 2008). 
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E. SUMMARY 
HADR missions around the globe and here at home require a vast array of 
resources to relieve the suffering of the effected populations. Whether is it from floods, 
earthquakes, hurricanes/typhoons, or from combat the USG has made this type of 
operation a primary mission for the DOD. As we have seen in recent events around the 
world the DOD and DoS stand ready to provide rapid assistance to countries in need 
when called upon. The need to operate in an environment inclusive of other agencies, 
NGOs and the local government is imperative. Each group brings with them an expertise 
which must be leveraged to ensure maximum effort is being made to alleviate human 
suffering. 
The unique capabilities of the U.S. Navy lend itself well to the relief efforts of 
HADR missions. The ability to rapidly deploy forces around the world with short notice 
and to be self-sustaining for an extended period of time is invaluable to ensuring a 
successful HADR mission. The Navy’s vast logistical capabilities are unmatched by any 
other governmental agency. When called on the Navy can bring ashore needed material 
and manpower without the traditional infrastructure needed by other agencies. This 
capability is the reason the Navy is often tasked to assist USAID in their relief efforts. 
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III. DATA COLLECTION 
A. OVERVIEW 
The data collection for this research project focused on the published lessons 
learned from recent HADR missions. Specifically, the researcher reviewed the lessons 
learned from the Navy’s response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake and the 2005 Pakistan 
earthquake.  
B. NAVY PROCEDURES 
The primary purpose of any USG led HADR mission is the elimination of human 
suffering (Department of State, 2013). The USG has several tools to aid in this effort to 
include everything from financial assistance to a large scale HADR operation using the 
full might and capabilities of the U.S. military (Department of Defense, 2011). When 
called upon the DOD works under the direction of the DoS through the Director of 
USAID. The SecDef appoints the commander of the geographic combatant command 
responsible for the affected country to be the lead military organization. Once appointed 
the commander may create or task an existing Joint Task Force (JTF) to plan and conduct 
the HADR mission. The JTF commander coordinates directly with the DoS and USAID 
personnel through the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). The OFDA is 
the link between DoS and DOD during HADR missions. OFDA falls under the USAIDs 
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) (Department of 
Defense, 2011). Beyond the primary goal of the elimination of human suffering the JTF 
commander may be tasked by USAID to accomplish specific goals. These goals can 
range from a single flight of supplies to a full battle groups deployment with an 
amphibious landing of Marines. Most commonly, the goals the JTF commander is tasked 
with carrying out involve large scale logistics. 
1. Background 
The purpose for the DOD to respond to DoS led HADR missions is due to the 
military’s unique capabilities to respond to, plan for and conduct large scale logistical 
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operations in short notice anywhere in the world and be self-sustaining for an extended 
period of time. Therefore, when the civilian transportation and logistics networks break 
down or are overwhelmed by the magnitude of the event the DoS requests the assistance 
of the DOD (U.S. Agency for International Development, 2005). When tasked to assist 
the DOD is given specific goals to accomplish. The basic goals for a HADR mission are 
usually to alleviate suffering, save lives, conduct evacuations, and provide basic services 
such as food, water, shelter and medical services. As the mission becomes more complex 
so do the goals. Specific goals may include airport or seaport reconstruction and 
operation, police and security services, construction and repair of electric grids, power 
generation and sewer systems. The goals given to the DOD to carry out will determine 
the necessary response by the JTF commander. For small scale operations the DOD may 
be called upon to fly relief supplies into the effected country. This would include only a 
single aircraft making a single flight. In large scale operations the scale of goals might 
require hundreds of flights carrying tons of cargo and personnel. It might include an 
entire battle group landing ashore with a full combat ready MEU and support aircraft 
(Department of Defense, 2011). 
2. Interagency Operability 
The DOD divides the world into six separate geographic combatant commands 
(GCC) each with its own defined areas of responsibilities (AOR). The GCC commander 
has responsibility over the AOR as well as the troops within his or her AOR. It is also 
tasked with coordinating with other governmental agencies that operate in its AOR. This 
coordination is called interagency operability. This coordination has been an area 
identified as needing improvement through after action reports and lessons learned 
(Buchanan, 2009). Specifically during HADR missions the need for coordination is 
paramount. One reason for a breakdown in coordination between the GCC and DoS has 
been lack of synchronization with how the DoS divides the world. The DoS divides the 
world by regional bureaus. Unfortunately this division does not correspond with the GCC 
divisions by the DOD. Due to this lack of synchronization of land division the 
coordination of HADR missions has suffered. In addition to the different divisions and 
AORs the location of the GCC and regional bureaus are often not within proximity to 
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each other. This distance only serves to decrease the potential for interagency operability, 
further complicating coordination efforts. 
3. Lessons Learned 
The USN has created and recently updated an online system for use as a 
repository of after action reports and lessons learned from naval operations and missions. 
This website is designed to provide commanders and staff planners with a resource to 
learn from past missions prior to conducting future missions (Navy Warfare 
Development Command, 2013). 
a. Haiti Earthquake 2010 
As with any military operation success is contingent upon the following key 
aspects; planning, a clearly defined command and control structure, and coordination 
with other governmental agencies, NGOs and the local government. However, the 
primary areas needing improvement identified in the lessons learned during the Haiti 
earthquake response, Operation Unified Response, were precisely those areas (Ferguson, 
2010). 
The major findings in the lessons learned for the Haiti earthquake response 
included a lack of planning, a lack of visibility into the flow of material into the area and 
the ineffective information technology (IT) infrastructure. The absence of a disaster 
response plan was directly responsible for most of the problems with the operation. 
Specifically, the flow of material and personnel into the area was hampered and 
disjointed due to no central coordination or plan. One report stated that each command 
was independent as to what material and supplies they were to bring with them. This 
caused a bottleneck of unnecessary material which delayed needed lifesaving supplies 
and personnel. The biggest problem encountered was the lack of communication the 
military had with civilian agencies and NGOs (Ferguson, 2010). The equipment the 
military uses is a war time based classified network. This network prevented their ability 
to communicate with non-military. During the first few days of the operation cell phones 
and email were the primary means of communication for the non-military agencies. 
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However, the shipboard internet had severely limited bandwidth and prevented the use of 
commercial channels of communication such as email for the military relief providers. 
Specific lessons learned during the Haiti earthquake: 
Planning (Policy, Organization) 
 Standing disaster response plans are needed to enable more responsive 
operations by addressing the flow of aid and personnel. 
 Each combatant commander should maintain a baseline HA/DR 
CONPLAN. 
 Fleet commanders should establish maritime HA/DR plans. Ensure that 
plans include logistical branches specific for major categories of likely 
disasters (hurricane, earthquake, tsunami) as well as considerations for 
desired JFMCC force composition (CSG vs. ARG). 
 Establish scalable baseline contingency manning documents for major 
types of events, including HA/DR, and ensure assignment of qualified 
personnel with pertinent skill sets. 
 USFF and CPF increase Numbered Fleet, CSG, and PHIBRON staff 
participation in annual JLOTS exercises.  
 NWC increase exposure to JLOTS and MPSRON capabilities in JPME 
and MSOC curriculum. 
 As required, Navy component commanders (NCCs) should assess forward 
logistics site early and augment as required with berthing facilities and 
support equipment. 
 The SOUTHCOM AOR does not have a standing HA/DR plan. There was 
no discernable mission analysis or operations plan to vet, track, or 
prioritize flow of aid or personnel into Haiti.  
 In the absence of an off-the-shelf plan, the slow rate of JTF establishment 
(due in part to APOD bottlenecks) contributed to problems with the 
TPFDD, the logistics flow, and aid distribution. 
In-Transit Visibility (Policy, Leadership) 
 The flow of Navy personnel, sustainment, equipment, and aid was directed 
by multiple chains of command without coordination of tracking, 
management, and distribution. 
 OPNAV N4 examine methodologies for naval forces to maintain better in-
transit visibility of logistics during HA/DR. 
 Navy commanders (JFMCC, NCC) establish single entity/POC to 
coordinate, promulgate and prioritize Navy logistic requirements in 
support of military, USAID, and NGOs. 
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 FISCs should act as gatekeeper ensuring all shipments are prioritized, 
marked and/or include bills of lading that specifically indicate contents 
and intended destination. 
 Doctrine reference proper authorities (such as World Health Organization) 
to provide key metrics for HA/DR assessment, such as per capita 
requirements for daily consumption of water. 
 Fleet commanders ensure Navy liaison officers are provided to JTF 
commander during disaster response operations to coordinate the Navy 
plan in alignment with State Department / USAID intent and JTF 
guidance. 
 Navy Commanders (JFMCC, NCC) emphasize to their staffs the 
requirements for detailed planning of logistics flows as soon as possible 
after a disaster response begins, and ensure these plans are promulgated to 
and coordinated with supporting forces. 
 USAID worked closely with the JTF commander, but coordination 
between Navy tactical forces, USAID, and NGOs for aid distribution 
could have been better during the first weeks of the operation. 
 Navy force providers had difficulty assessing Haitian population’s needs, 
leading to unwanted and unnecessary supplies being pushed to Haiti and 
displacing or delaying other needed aid supplies. 
 USAID responsible for establishing priorities for aid distribution. USAID 
and NGOs were not familiar with military processes or procedures. No 
single point of contact provided to work with disparate NGOs, making it 
difficult to assess population needs. 
Navy IT Systems (Policy, Materiel) 
 Navy infrastructure and IA policies are not adapted to operations in an 
environment involving media, NGOs, and other partners. 
 DONCIO review and update IT systems and IA policies to facilitate 
collaboration with HA/DR community in non-classified environment 
(using sites such as: All Partners Access Network (apan.org), Relief Web 
(reliefweb.int), Google Mail (Gmail), and social networking sites like 
Twitter and Facebook). 
 HA/DR operational effectiveness is hampered by “go to war” information 
technology (IT) systems. Navy infrastructure and IA policies are not 
adapted to operations in an environment involving media, NGOs, and 
other partners. 
 SIPR-based warfighting infrastructure; HA/DR partners operate on non-
classified Internet. 
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 Navy first responders relied on cell phones, Blackberrys, and Gmail, 
potentially putting mission execution at odds with established information 
assurance (IA) policies. In some locations, texting was more reliable than 
military comms. 
 Afloat computer systems and firewalls hampered access to Internet 
resources, inhibiting development and dissemination of situational 
awareness.  
 DONCIO review and update IT systems and IA policies to facilitate 
collaboration with HA/DR community in non-classified environment 
(using sites such as: All Partners Access Network (apan.org), 
Harmonieweb.org, Relief Web (reliefweb.int), Google Mail (Gmail), and 
social networking sites like Twitter and Facebook). (Ferguson, 2010) 
b. 2005 Pakistan Earthquake 
The major findings in the lessons learned for the 2005 Pakistan earthquake 
response were poor communication network and coordination with the host country 
military, coordination issues with NATO forces providing relief efforts, and minor 
contingency contracting issues related to financial management (Long, 2006; Phister Jr, 
2005). The overall mission was considered a success by USG leadership and by DOD 
leadership. However, the lessons learned from the operation give some areas where 
improvement can be made.  
The U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan and his staff were the lead USG agency on the 
ground in Pakistan immediately following the earthquake. Once USAID OFDA arrived in 
country they took over coordination of relief efforts for USG personnel. All HADR 
coordination efforts were ultimately controlled by the host nation military. The Pakistan 
government appointed an Army general to lead the Federal Relief Commission (FRC). 
The FRC was the lead on all relief efforts.  
Specific lessons learned during the Pakistan earthquake:  
 Information Accuracy: Throughout the recovery, the accuracy of the 
information collected continued to be a problem and was evaluated as low. 
 Interoperability: One of the key aspects that worked throughout the 
recovery was interoperability, which was high. 
 Information Distribution: Another key shortfall during the recovery dealt 
with information distribution. This improved to medium towards the end. 
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 Information Shareability: A shortfall here was another key aspect that 
affected the recovery effort. At best it could be rated as medium. 
 Information Management: Staff working in informational roles in Pakistan 
recognized that information management was very poor within their 
agencies. 
 Communications Infrastructure: Although agencies claimed to subscribe 
to the principle of “Communications first,” none of them successfully 
achieved this in Pakistan. The staff in Pakistan possessed the necessary 
skills to manage their IT, but not always to manage telecommunications. 
 Lack of Timely Information: Initially there was a lack of information 
regarding the earthquake that caused confusion and what information that 
did get through was confused and contradictory. 
 Strain of Logistics and Resources: The terrain and sheer scale of the 
disaster required unprecedented logistics and resources. Destruction of 
almost all land communications and lack of Satellite cell/mobile-phones 
contributed towards the initial lack of coordination. 
 Disrupted Communications: Since the infrastructure was massively 
damaged, to provide communication capabilities non-organic assets were 
shared between locals and NGOs, creating signs of interdependence on 
technical assets. (Phister Jr, 2005) 
C. INTERVIEWS 
Interviews were conducted with both governmental and non-governmental 
agencies operating in the HADR field. The interviews included planners from the United 
States Southern and Pacific Commands, USAID Strategic Communication Outreach 
Office for Civilian and Military Cooperation, an American not-for-profit medical NGO 
and an international not-for-profit child protection NGO. The interviews consisted of 
questions asking for firsthand knowledge of recent HADR missions they were directly a 
part of. Specifically, they were asked to describe methods for planning and executing 
HADR missions, lessons learned from after action reports and best practices they 
observed during the HADR efforts.  
The individuals interviewed were chosen for their level of expertise in the field of 
HADR and their recent involvement in several HADR missions around the world. These 
individuals represent vastly different perspectives on the performance of the USN during 
recent HADR missions. Their opinions are a direct result from their interaction with the 
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USN either during the planning phase or during the execution phase of the HADR 
mission. Their inputs in this discussion are relevant because it offers a perspective 
different from our own.  
1. United States Pacific Command J5 Operations Officer 
The first interview was conducted with the J5 Operations Officer for the U.S. 
Pacific Command (PACOM) Lieutenant Colonel Daniel T. Lang. Lieutenant Colonel (Lt 
Col) Lang has extensive experience working with HADR planning and execution in his 
position at PACOM. PACOM is headquartered in Hawaii and is responsible for the 
largest AOR of all six of the GCCs. The AOR includes the Pacific Ocean, Southeast 
Asia, Australia and the hundreds of islands contained within the Pacific Ocean.  
The PACOM AOR is home to several types of natural disasters. The Pacific 
Ocean is rimmed with active volcanos and fault lines. The region is frequented by 
massive storms called typhoons which can clock wind speed in excess of 135 knots. 
When even small storms or small earthquakes hit these areas the local facilities can be 
easily overwhelmed or completely destroyed. Without basic lifesaving facilities or 
equipment these effected countries are completely dependent upon outside assistance. 
According to Lt Col Lang,  
PACOM has the largest contingent of military equipment and personnel of 
all the GCCs. This gives the PACOM commander the flexibility to 
respond appropriately to HADR missions throughout his AOR when 
called upon. Compared to other GCC which might need to request 
additional units in order to carry out their missions the PACOM 
commander is self-sufficient to conduct missions without requesting 
additional units. (Lt Col Lang, USAF, personal communication, 
September 25, 2014) 
As the J5 Operations Officer for PACOM, Lt Col Lang has been a part of the 
planning and execution of several HADR missions. Specifically he was involved in 
operation Damayan. Operation Damayan was the DOD response to the super typhoon 
which hit the Philippine Islands in 2014. The typhoon had wind speeds in excess of 195 
MPH with gusts in excess of 235 MPH (Lt Col Lang, USAF, personal communication, 
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September 25, 2014). The interview with Lt Col Lang was based upon his experiences 
with operation Damayan. 
Upon receiving tasking from the SecDef to conduct relief efforts following the 
typhoon that struck the Philippines, Lt Col Lang utilized the Theater Campaign Plan 
(TCP) for the operation. According to Lt Col Lang, the TCP is a set of plans drawn up to 
provide the frame work for organizing and planning for contingency operations in the 
PACOM AOR. Once the planning began PACOM planners were contacted by USAID 
and began coordinating the requirements and goals for the operation.  
Lt Col Lang stated that the lessons learned from the Haiti HADR operation led to 
improvements in the planning process and coordination between the DOD and USAID. 
He said, “Despite the improvements there were some areas that could have been better, 
according to Lt Col Lang.” He further stated: 
The DOD is very good at quickly entering a country and establishing a 
very large foot print. This in itself is great when you need to move 
massive amounts of material into an area with little or no supporting 
infrastructure. However, this could also be a double-edged sword when the 
local population or the government sees your actions as an occupier or 
nation builder and not as humanitarian assistance. The model of coming in 
big and fast is how the DOD operates in war time. (Lt Col Lang, USAF, 
personal communication, September 25, 2014) 
Lt Col Lang points out that this may not work for HADR. He explained: 
The sight of amphibious landing craft coming ashore under the cover of 
helicopters with men in uniforms can be easily misunderstood. The DOD 
often does not understand the political and cultural implications of their 
actions and therefore should rely on more guidance from USAID. At times 
it may be necessary to go in big and fast, but more likely the prudent step 
should be to move gradually. (Lt Col Lang, USAF, personal 
communication, September 25, 2014) 
Another point Lt Col Lang expressed is the need for a clear DOD end state. “The 
quality of life or living standards in some of the countries where we conduct HADR 
missions were not great before the natural disaster hit,” according to Lt Col Lang.” Lt Col 
Lang noticed it is often the desire of the DOD to alleviate all suffering once they arrive in 
one of these countries. “However, by doing this the DOD stops conducting HADR 
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operations and begins nation building. This is not the role of the DOD or of the HADR 
mission. There needs to be clear guidance from USAID as to when the DODs mission is 
complete and when they should completely pull out all troops.” Lt Col went on to say, 
“USAID and various NGOs are better suited to conduct long-term HADR missions 
whereas the DOD is best when there is a need for short-term, large scale logistical 
requirements.”  
The final point Lt Col Lang made for lessons learned was the lack of good 
communication between the DOD and other governmental and non-governmental 
agencies:  
This problem has plagued HADR operations for a long time. The 
communications equipment used by the military is a war based secure 
network utilizing line-of-sight and over-the-horizon radios and satellites. 
These military communication systems were designed to make them 
impenetrable by outside actors. The systems are very effective at ensuring 
secure communications between military units. However, they miss the 
mark when there is a need to include outside agencies or systems. (Lt Col 
Lang, USAF, personal communication, September 25, 2014) 
The communication systems used by NGOs or other governmental agencies 
typically involve cell phones and internet based programs such as email, smart phone 
applications and websites. According to Lt Col Lang, these modern forms of 
communication have been slow to make their way onboard ships and are rarely used by 
the military. The main reason for this absence of technology on Navy ships is due to very 
low bandwidth and a lack of security (Lt Col Lang, USAF, personal communication, 
September 25, 2014). 
2. United States Southern Command J53 Contingency Planner 
The second interview was conducted with the J53 Contingency Planner for the 
U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) Major (Maj) Beth Rosario. Maj Rosario is 
responsible for the planning of all contingency operations carried out by SOUTHCOM. 
In her role as a planner she has gained valuable knowledge into the planning process 
utilizing past lessons learned and current military doctrine. Maj Rosario has been 
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involved with the planning of several small scale HADR operations in the SOUTHCOM 
AOR.  
The SOUTHCOM AOR includes Central America, South America and the 
Caribbean. This region is often frequented by tropical storms, hurricanes, earthquakes 
and at times even civil unrest. The largest HADR operation in recent decades was in the 
SOUTHCOM AOR when the small nation of Haiti, in the Caribbean, was devastated by a 
massive earthquake in 2010. The SOUTHCOM commander was appointed by the SecDef 
to head the DOD relief efforts in Haiti.  
According to Maj Rosario, 
The majority of HADR operations in the SOUTHCOM AOR are for small 
scale relief efforts. However, the command is now prepared to handle all 
sizes of HADR missions. One of the lessons learned from the Haiti 
operation was the need to have operational plans established prior to 
natural disasters taking place. The Planning staffs at SOUTHCOM 
understand witch potential events to plan for and therefore establish 
country specific scenario plans. This prior planning allows the staff to 
better coordinate the assets needed to conduct the HADR missions when 
called upon. In the past the contingency planner would begin the planning 
process only after the event took place. This was one of the major findings 
in the Operation Unified Response after action report. 
One of the major lessons learned reported by Maj Rosario was the need for task 
force commanders to be more familiar with the policies and procedures for conducting 
HADR missions. According to Maj Rosario: 
The majority of training these commanders receive is in the art of combat. 
They are taught how to move fast and secure lines of communication into 
a country. It is this model the commanders follow when carrying out 
HADR missions. However, the commanders often act as if they are the 
lead agency and rush ahead of the process without USAID concurrence or 
even funding in place for the operation.  
Another point made by Maj Rosario is the need to improve coordination and 
communication with the NGOs, USAID, and the local population:  
One of the issues that arise from this lack of coordination and 
communication is a duplication of efforts. During several HADR missions 
it has been found that the material being brought into the country by the 
Navy is often either not needed or already provided by another agency. As 
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with most HADR events several NGOs respond. Their response is usually 
coordinated with their agency team already in country and has assessed 
the needs of the effected populations. Therefore, any duplication of effort 
by the Navy can create an abundance of material that may not be needed. 
(Maj. B. Rosario, USAF, personal communication, September 24, 2014). 
In addition, she states, “the movement of unneeded material can cause a bottle neck at the 
point of entry causing a delay of the material that is needed” (Maj. B. Rosario, USAF, 
personal communication, September 24, 2014). 
According to the major,  
During the Haiti relief efforts each Navy command that responded was 
tasked to bring relief supplies. There was no coordination with USAID or 
other NGOs as to which supplies to bring. A result was mountainous piles 
of unneeded material around the various ports of entry.  
The DOD is often one of the first organizations on scene. Their supplies are the 
first supplies to reach the effected people. However, other agencies have previously 
identified needs and begun the transportation of those items only to arrive to the country 
to find they are no longer needed. According to Maj Rosario: 
A duplication of effort has two effects. First, it wastes resources that could 
have been better utilized and second it is a disincentive to the NGO to 
purchase material and transport it to a country when the DOD may have 
already done so. (Personal communication, September 24, 2014). 
3. United States Agency for International Aid, Office of Foreign Disaster 
Assistance, Civilian Military Coordination 
The third interview was conducted with the head of the Civilian Military 
Coordination (CMC) within the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), which is 
part of USAIDs Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) 
Mrs. Samantha Novick. Mrs. Novick’s position within the CMC has the responsibility to: 
[P]rovide international disaster and HA and coordinate the USG response 
to declared disasters in foreign countries. USAID/OFDA’s mandate is to 
save lives, alleviate human suffering, and reduce the economic and social 
impact of disasters. OFDA formulates US foreign disaster assistance 
policy in coordination with other USG departments and agencies. It 
coordinates with USAID offices and others to provide relief supplies (e.g., 
blankets, plastic sheeting, sanitation, and hygiene kits), funds 
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implementing partners (e.g., UN agencies, NGOs, Red Cross) to provide 
direct support and HA, and develops and manages logistical, operational, 
and technical support for disaster responses. Besides its coordination 
activities within the USG, USAID/OFDA carries out these response 
options in coordination with the HN, donor countries, UN, NGOs, and 
IGOs. OFDA has assigned HA advisors/military to each geographic 
CCMD to coordinate responses involving DOD assistance, provide 
training, and advise planning. The CMC serves as USAIDs primary point 
of contact with DOD for developmental matters and provides liaison to 
major military commands, trains USAID and US military personnel, and 
plans and coordinates assistance in support of all programs of interest to 
both USAID and the military. It addresses areas of common interests 
between defense and development, with a focus on improving civilian-
military field readiness, programs, and coordination. CMC has assigned 
senior development officers to each GCC and has received [liaison 
officers] LNOs in return. (Department of Defense, 2014) 
Mrs. Novick provided information on how past HADR lessons learned drove the 
military and USAID to partner together to improve coordination. She stated,  
About a decade ago USAID and the DOD signed a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) allowing for USAID staff to be embarked within 
each of the GCC and to have military officers located at USAIDs 
headquarters in Washington DC. Currently, there are military liaison 
officers from the Navy and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers stationed in 
USAIDs headquarters, as well as COCOM liaison officers from each of 
the geographic combatant commands (with the exception of 
NORTHCOM) and several from USSOCOM. USAID sends 
representatives to the COCOMs as well. Each GCC hosts a USAID senior 
development advisor, deputy development advisor and a humanitarian 
assistance advisor to help ensure transparency throughout the planning, 
policy, training and communications lines of effort. (Mrs. Samantha 
Novick, USAID OFDA/CMC, personal communication, October 17, 
2014). 
4. Senior Navy Representative to USAID, DCHA/CMC 
The fourth interview was with the senior Navy representative from the Civilian-
Military Coordination Office within DCHA from USAID Captain (CAPT) Colleen 
Gallagher, Nurse Corps (NC), USN. This position was created over a decade ago with the 
MOU between the DOD and USAID. The purpose of this position is to facilitate 
information sharing and to coordinate interagency planning for contingency and HADR 
operations.  
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CAPT Gallagher has held this position at USAID for approximately three years. 
Prior to this assignment, CAPT Gallagher gained extensive operational experience 
onboard the hospital ship USNC Comfort. While on board she deployed to SOUTHCOM 
in support of Operation Unified Response in Haiti. With her background in the medical 
and her extensive tours working in the HADR field, CAPT Gallagher is regarded as an 
expert in HADR and interpretability.  
During the interview, CAPT Gallagher provided what she determined to be the 
greatest weakness within the Navy when conducting HADR missions. She pointed out, 
“due to the infrequent requirements, the knowledge of processes is limited. Specifically, 
the baseline understanding is low if disaster response is not at the same level of that for 
war fighting.” She says there needs to be greater emphasis placed on exercises to train for 
HADR missions. The only way to become proficient is to conduct training exercises.” In 
addition, CAPT Gallagher explained:  
There needs to be required training in the field of HADR. This can occur 
at the War Colleges, Naval Postgraduate School, or at leadership courses. 
There should also be opportunities made to allow for cross training. There 
are already courses offered by USAID, but there should be required 
training for all senior officers and planning staffs. 
Another area CAPT Gallagher focused on during the interview was the criticism 
for how the Navy has responded to HADR missions in the past. Specifically, “one of the 
criticisms is that the Navy comes in too big, too fast and does not stay very long” (CAPT 
Gallager, personal communication, October 22, 2014). To this point she elaborates:  
However, there is a reason for it. The Navy is not operating independently 
but rather as a supporting agency. When given a task to perform this is 
what the Navy does. It accomplishes the task and does it quickly. We send 
in a large group of people to respond. When we send in medical personnel, 
we also have to send in security, cooks and engineers. (CAPT Colleen 
Gallagher, NC, USN, Civilian-Military Coordination Office within DCHA 
from USAID, personal communication, October 22, 2014) 
The final topic CAPT Gallagher covered was the often cited issue with poor 
communications. She gave an example of how the hospital ship had very low bandwidth 
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making internet based communications with units ashore or intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs) and NGOs very difficult. In addition she states,  
When I went ashore and needed to contact the ship I found it hard to get 
through due to the ship only having a couple of phone lines. One solution 
the crew tried to correct for this was to use their personal cell phones. 
However, as the ship maneuvered off the coast [of Haiti] they would 
frequently lose cell service.  
Finally, as another attempt to fix the communication issue they used satellite 
phones. However, she said they were only available to senior officers due to cost and 
availability of phones (CAPT Colleen Gallagher, NC, USN, Civilian-Military 
Coordination Office within DCHA from USAID, personal communication, October 22, 
2014). 
5. Regional Director of a Medical NGO in Haiti 
The fifth interview was with a regional director of an American not-for-profit 
NGO which provides medical services to people in need around the world. The individual 
interviewed requested to remain anonymous but agreed to answer some questions. This 
individual will be referred to as “Medical Director.” Here is what he had to say,  
I have been deployed around the world to some of the hardest hit areas. 
I’ve worked in Africa with the AIDS problem. I’ve worked with patients 
with malaria. I’ve been in areas as natural disasters occur and I’ve gone 
into areas after natural disasters hit. When I’m not traveling with [the 
organization] I’m working in a hospital in Boston. (Personal 
communication, October 10, 2014) 
When asked about working with the military, Medical Director had this to say:  
In all of the places I’ve gone to, I only worked with the military once. That 
was when I was in Haiti after the earthquake. There were other times when 
the military was operating in the same area but I did not have any 
interaction with them. I arrived in Haiti just after the military took over the 
airport. We were waiting on a flight of medical equipment to arrive when 
we learned that the military would not allow the plane to land. They had 
redirected it to some airport in the Dominican Republic. We had to truck 
our supplies in which took several days. I tried to ask the people in charge 
at the airport why and was told other flights had priority. The other flights 
were military flights with their own supplies. I needed the equipment. 
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People’s lives depended on it. (Personal communication, October 10, 
2014) 
When asked what the military could do differently to help meet his organizations 
goals what would it be? He said,  
Communication. The military comes in and just takes over. Tell me what 
you are doing. Tell me why you are doing it. Tell me what I can do to 
work together. We have the same goal, to save lives, but it seems like we 
are not there to them. But when they need us then all of a sudden were 
important. The military does a lot of good. But they need to find a way to 
work with us and not over us. (Medical Director, American Medical NGO, 
personal communication, October 10, 2014) 
6. Member of an International Child Protection NGO in Haiti 
The final interview was with a volunteer from an international not-for-profit NGO 
specializing in child protection, adoption and family care programs. The NGO has 
assisted children around the world receive the care they needed and assisted with the 
placement of orphaned children into families through adoption. The NGO volunteer 
requested to remain anonymous since he did not have authority to speak on behalf of his 
NGO. The individual will be referred to as “Volunteer.”  
When asked if he had any interaction with the U.S. military while in Haiti, 
Volunteer had this to say:  
One of the projects we took on in Haiti was to provide shoes to hundreds 
of displaced kids. This is the project I worked on. There were thousands of 
kids whose homes were destroyed. So my boss reached out to our head 
office and requested shoes. After about a week they had purchased or 
received enough donated shoes to fill an entire shipping container. 
However, before the container arrived in Haiti the military showed up with 
truckloads of clothes and shoes. They gave the clothes and shoes to 
another group to distribute. So when our shoes arrived there was little 
need for them. We had nowhere to store them and the container had to be 
returned. So we unloaded them into a pile on the ground and left them 
there. Over time people would come and take some shoes but it was a 
huge waste of time and money. We could have focused on other projects if 
we knew the military was going to do that. (Volunteer, International Child 
Care NGO, personal communication, October 1, 2014) 
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When asked what the military could do differently to help meet his organizations 
goals what would it be?  He said,  
I guess the military could somehow post online a list of projects they are 
doing and also put up a list of projects they want groups to do. This way 
we don’t duplicate to work. They can focus on what they do and we can 
focus on what we do. (Volunteer, International Child Care NGO, personal 
communication, October 1, 2014) 
D. SUMMARY 
The primary purpose of any USG led HADR mission is stated as the elimination 
of human suffering (Department of State, 2013). The USG has several tools to aid in this 
effort to include everything from financial assistance to a large scale HADR operation 
using the full might and capabilities of the U.S. military. When USAID requests 
assistance from the DOD they delegate specific goals for carrying out the relief efforts. 
These specific goals can range from a single flight of supplies to a full Battle Group 
deployment with an amphibious landing of Marines. The DODs participation in HADR 
missions is due to the military’s unique capabilities to respond to, plan for and conduct 
large scale logistical operations in short notice anywhere in the world and be self-
sustaining for an extended period of time. Therefore, when the civilian transportation and 
logistics networks break down or are overwhelmed by the magnitude of the event, the 
DoS requests the assistance of the DOD (U.S. Agency for International Development, 
2005). 
After each HADR mission the DOD collects lessons learned from the personnel 
and commands conducting the operations on the ground and in support of those 
operations. These lessons learned are a collection of areas identified as needing attention 
prior to future missions. The lessons learned for the HADR missions in Haiti and 
Pakistan showed that the U.S. Navy is a very capable force able to adapt to complicated 
challenges. In both instances the Navy was limited in their coordination with other 
agencies specifically USAID. These limitations were a result of inadequate 
communications equipment and technology on board ships and on the ground. Inadequate 
planning was another lesson learned shared by both missions. These lessons learned and 
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several others discussed in this chapter show the potential for improvement and the areas 
where the Navy was successful.   
The following chapter analyzes the lessons learned and the interviews into a 
comprehensive grading matrix. The matrix is further broken down to provide 




IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The overarching goal of eliminating human suffering after a disaster is one of the 
main reasons why the USG chooses to participate in HADR missions. Throughout recent 
history the USG working with the U.S. Navy has been very successful at achieving this 
goal. With hundreds of missions conducted in the past few decades the U.S. Navy has 
been instrumental in supporting this goal and making it a reality. Under the direction of 
USAID and in concert with their sister services the Navy has saved countless lives, 
delivered many tons of food, water and necessary supplies to people in need around the 
globe. The Navy has largely achieved their stated goals.  
As with any successful mission the analysis of lessons learned is a very important 
step to ensure continued success. This review has identified areas that need additional 
attention and focus to ensure future success. Based on the data from this project the 
researcher has compiled a list of the most frequently mentioned areas needing 
improvement. The areas are; communication, command and control (C2), level of 
knowledge, coordination (internal), coordination (external), logistics, planning and 
operations.  
B. LESSONS LEARNED ANALYSIS 
The methodology for the analysis of the lessons learned was conducted in four 
parts. The first step was to identify the most frequently reported problems that occurred 
during recent HADR missions. The second step was to assign a policy to the problem to 
determine if policy was adhered to or to determine if the problem was the result of a lack 
of training. The third step was to assign a grade to the problem for both the literature 
review and interview. The final step was to provide a recommendation for how the Navy 
can correct the problem or at least mitigate its effects on the mission. Table 2 is a matrix 
for the problems identified by the researcher through the lessons learned analysis.  
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Table 2.   Lessons Learned Grade Matrix 
 
 
1. Problem Identification 
The first step of the lessons learned analysis was to identify the most frequently 
reported problems from recent HADR missions. The researcher has narrowed the list 
down to eight problems which were reported in both the literature review and the 
interviews and were identified as being relevant to the current and future success of 
HADR missions. Each of the eight problems is listed below with a brief explanation. 
2. Policy 
All HADR missions are conducted through the GCC utilizing a joint task force. 
Therefore the policies the researcher focuses on for the lessons learned are the joint 
publications. The joint publications are the guiding references for planning and 
conducting joint operations. For each of the identified problems from the lessons learned 
the researcher has assigned one or more of the Joint Publications which best addresses the 
broad topic area of the identified problem.  
Lesson Learned Policy Litrature Review Interviews
Logistics Joint Pub 4-0 Green Green
Communications Joint Pub 3-29 RED RED
Command and Control (C2) Joint Pub 3-29 Green Yellow
Level of Knowledge All Publications Yellow Yellow
Coordination Internal Joint Pub 3-0 Yellow Green
Coordination External 
(Interoperability)
Joint Pub 3-0 Yellow Yellow
Planning Joint Pub 5-0 yellow yellow
Operations Joint Pub 3-0 Green Green
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3. Grade 
The researcher subjectively analyzed the identified problem from the lessons 
learned and determined a color coded grade. The grading system uses a Red, Yellow and 
Green color code to demonstrate the severity of the problem to mission success. A grade 
of Green demonstrates that the problem identified is either very minor or in keeping with 
regulations. The severity of a grade of Green on future missions is very low and should 
only receive attention only after all other issues are addressed. A grade of Yellow is an 
area of concern and should be addressed to prevent future problems. This grade was 
assigned to a problem which has or could cause derogation to the mission. A grade of 
Red is an area which should be addressed immediately and proactively to prevent future 
mission failures. This grade is assigned due to an area being identified as directly 
affecting a key aspect of the mission.  
4. Recommendation 
The final step in the lessons learned analysis is the researcher’s recommendation 
for how the Navy should address correcting the identified problems and the methods for 
ensuring they do not continue to prevent mission success. The recommendations are 
based upon a best case approach without a regard to cost or political considerations. 
Future research may be needed to fully vet multiple courses of action to better account 
for cost and political interests in the recommendations for correcting these identified 
problems.  
a. Logistics 
Logistics refers to the coordination and transportation of material and personnel in 
support of USG efforts for HADR missions. Table 3 is a matrix for the problem of 
logistics identified by the researcher through the lessons learned analysis. 
Table 3.   Logistics Lessons Learned Grade Matrix 
 
Lesson Learned Policy Litrature Review Interviews
Logistics Joint Pub 4-0 Green Green
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(1) Problem Identification 
The lessons learned reported after the Haiti earthquake showed a severe lack of 
coordination between the JTF and USAID in determining and organizing the material 
needed for the relief efforts. However, since the Haiti mission the Navy has dramatically 
improves their logistical coordination. They accomplished this in ways. The first was 
through the lessons learned website which provided all future commanders and staff 
planners with a set of lessons learned by which to prevent the same problems. The second 
was through the MOU with USAID where each organization embedded personnel within 
the other to improve interagency communication and coordination. These changes 
resulting from the Haiti mission have directly led to improvement in all HADR missions 
since.  
(2) Policy 
The policy which governs logistics is the Joint Logistics (Joint Publication 4-0) 
(Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013). The procedures outlined in this publication specifically 
explain the role of the JTF as a supporting agency and their need to coordinate with 
USAID to determine the proper logistical load out for HADR missions.  
(3) Grade 
The researcher has assigned a grade of Green given the superior ability for the 
Navy to carryout massive logistical operations in support of HADR missions. Despite the 
problems encountered during the Haiti mission the Navy has taken steps to correct for 
this problem. 
(4) Recommendation 
The Navy should continue to support the MOU with USAID to ensure the 
communication and coordination successes are strengthened. In addition the Navy should 
update the joint publications to make reporting detailed lessons learned a requirement for 
all missions. This change to the regulations should allow for further the improvements 
found in the logistic area to all other areas.  
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b. Communications 
Communications refers to the ability of the Navy to communicate with all 
stakeholders within the HADR community during a HADR mission. The current method 
of using high side email and military radios directly prevents non-military from being 
able to pass important information in a timely manner. Table 4 is a matrix for the 
problem of communications identified by the researcher through the lessons learned 
analysis. 
Table 4.   Communication Lessons Learned Grade Matrix 
 
 
(1) Problem Identification  
The lessons learned identified numerous instances where poor or no 
communications on the Navy side played a key role in mission degradation. It has been 
acknowledged that naval vessels lack adequate low side, high speed and high bandwidth 
internet capability to properly access and communicate through unclassified civilian 
networks during HADR missions. The necessity to communicate online with other 
government agencies and NGOs during an HADR operation is paramount for mission 
success. In addition to a lack of internet access, cellular communication also caused 
problems during recent HADR missions. Most civilian agencies communicate primarily 
through cell phones. Apart from instances where the mobile network is damaged or 
destroyed cell phones make up the majority of communications with civilian agencies. 
This is often a problem for the Navy given its ships distance to the shore and the inability 
to receive a mobile signal. In addition, once ashore the Navy often lacks an adequate 




Lesson Learned Policy Litrature Review Interviews
Communications Joint Pub 3-29 RED RED
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(2) Policy  
The policy which best encompasses the need for effective communications is the 
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (Joint Publication 3-29). Specifically, the policy states: 
Effective communications systems are vital to planning, conducting, and 
sustaining successful FHA operations. Operations, logistic, and 
intelligence functions depend on responsive communications. 
Communications are the central system that not only ties together all 
aspects of joint operations, but also allows C2 of forces. Therefore, the 
FHA plan must include procedures to provide interoperable and 
compatible communications among participants. (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2014) 
(3) Grade  
The need for effective communication with all participants during a HADR 
operation is vital to mission success. Therefore, given the repeated instances during 
several recent HADR missions where Navy communications was poor or non-existent the 
researcher has graded this problem as Red.  
(4) Recommendation  
There are two issues to address here. The first is the issue of inadequate internet 
access to civilian networks. To remedy this issue the Navy should invest in upgrading 
their shipboard low side broadband service. There needs to adequate access to civilian 
agency websites and commercial email for all personal onboard to ensure everyone is up 
to date on the current status of the relief effort.  
The second issue is the access to cellular phone service. While at sea Navy ships 
often operate outside the range of mobile phone signals. One remedy to this problem 
could be to issue satellite phones to key personnel onboard. This would negate the 
cellular signal problem and at the same time negate any problems caused by damaged or 
destroyed cellular networks.  
Finally, the joint publication should be updated to require all ships responding to 
HADR missions shall have adequate low side internet access. This internet should 
include access to all websites necessary to conduct HADR missions. In addition the 
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publications should mandate the ship have an adequate supply of satellite phones for key 
personnel both onboard and ashore.  
c. Command and Control  
Command and control refers to the ability for the JTF commander to understand 
their role as a supporting agency. The lead role for HADR missions fall to USAID and 
therefore the Navy must coordinate all actions with them prior to execution. Table 5 is a 
matrix for the problem of C2 identified by the researcher through the lessons learned 
analysis. 
Table 5.   Command and Control Lessons Learned Grade Matrix 
 
 
(1) Problem Identification  
The lessons learned identified a couple instances where the Navy’s command and 
control (C2) structure began to step out of the role as a supporting agency to the role of 
supported. This problem has been identified mainly by USAID in their role as the lead 
agency for HADR missions. Reports show that the Navy leadership has a tendency to 
enter a situation as the lead based on their training for combat operations where the 
military holds that role. However, the Navy has seen improvement in this area over the 
past few years. This improvement is attributed to training of senior leadership involved in 
HADR planning and execution.  
(2) Policy  
Several of the Joint Publications refer to USAID as the lead agency for HADR 
missions. However, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (Joint Publication 3-29) 
specifically delineates the role of the DOD as the supporting agency which receives all 
directions from USAID.  
 
Lesson Learned Policy Litrature Review Interviews
Command and Control (C2) Joint Pub 3-29 Green Yellow
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(3) Grade  
The grade assigned to this issue differs between the literature review and the 
interviews. In one of the interviews there were mentions of where the Navy was reported 
to have either stepped over the line in their role as supporting agency or completely took 
over the role as lead agency despite the presence of USAID. Therefore, the grade 
assigned is Yellow. The grade assigned to the literature review if Green due to only a 
brief mention of the potential of this occurring.  
(4) Recommendation  
The best method for ensuring compliance with this requirement is through 
training of the personal in leadership positions who would be assigned to lead joint task 
forces in support of HADR missions. The publications are clear on this requirement and 
therefore do not need to be updated. One possible method for conducting this training 
would be to begin training for junior officers on the Navy’s role in HADR missions 
during their initial joint professional military education (JPME) course work. This 
training can then be followed up throughout the officer’s career by providing additional 
HADR training at the senior war college course and during various flag officer training 
courses.  
d. Level of Knowledge 
Level of knowledge refers to the degree to which the commander responsible for 
carrying out HADR missions and staff planners planning HADR missions conduct 
training exercises to be prepared to conduct future mission. Table 6 is a matrix for the 
problem of level of knowledge identified by the researcher through the lessons learned 
analysis. 
Table 6.   Level of Knowledge Lessons Learned Grade Matrix 
 
 
Lesson Learned Policy Litrature Review Interviews
Level of Knowledge All Publications Yellow Yellow
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(1) Problem Identification  
Both the literature review and the interviews identified level of knowledge as an 
issue needing attention. Specifically, they are referring to the senior level planners and 
commanders tasked with executing HADR missions. Currently the majority of the 
attention for training and conducting exercises focuses of warfighting skills. Little if any 
time is spent training these commanders and planners on the policies and procedures for 
conducting HADR missions.  
(2) Policy  
In order to fully understand the HADR mission set a commander must be familiar 
with all of the joint publications and how they relate to HADR missions. Specifically, 
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (Joint Publication 3-29) (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014) 
pulls together all of the other joint regulations in a comprehensive overview and details 
the HADR process. 
(3) Grade  
For this lesson learned problem the researcher has assigned the grade of Yellow. 
This grade is assigned due to the potential for mission failure due to a lack of prior 
exercises.   
(4) Recommendation  
All Navy JTF commanders and staff planners should at a minimum be required to 
conduct war gaming on potential HADR missions. This war gaming exercise would give 
the planners and commanders a better understanding of HADR mission intricacies 
allowing for greater success in future missions. In addition to war gaming the Navy 
should require all GCCs conduct annual HADR exercises involving multiple ships to 
practice various aspects of a HADR mission. This annual exercise would increase the 
fleets readiness and ensure a more coordinated and efficient response to HADR missions.  
e. Coordination (Internal) 
Coordination (internal) refers to the ability of Navy units to coordinate their 
actions with other Navy units during HADR missions. Table 7 is a matrix for the problem 
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of coordination (internal) identified by the researcher through the lessons learned 
analysis. 
Table 7.   Coordination (Internal) Lessons Learned Grade Matrix 
 
 
(1) Problem Identification 
During the relief efforts for the Haiti earthquake the Navy was tasked to deploy to 
SOUTHCOM with very short notice. As a result the ship commanders were not provided 
with specific items to deploy with but were rather allowed to determine on their own 
which items to bring. This lack of internal coordination led to a bottleneck of material 
entering the country and a waste in resources.  
(2) Policy 
According to Joint Operations (Joint Publication 3-0) (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008) 
the responsibility for coordinating the logistics of resources fall on the GCC. Specifically 
the joint publication states, “All CCDRs provide strategic direction; assign missions, 
tasks, forces, and resources…” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008) 
(3) Grade 
The U.S. Navy is a very capable force extremely proficient in the planning for 
contingency. However, during Operation Unified Response one of the main lessons 
learned was the lack internal coordination. Therefore the researcher assigned the grade of 
Yellow for the literature review. The interviews conducted referenced minor issues with 
internal coordination but for the most part did not see it as a major issue. Therefore, the 
researcher assigned a grade of Green for the interviews.  
(4) Recommendation  
The coordination of resource management must be with the GCC. If this is held 
constant than each ship commander should seek guidance prior to deploying. The 
Lesson Learned Policy Litrature Review Interviews
Coordination Internal Joint Pub 3-0 Yellow Green
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individual ship commander does not have the visibility to understand the requirements for 
a mission, and therefore, should rely on the GCC for guidance. The solution to this 
problem could be solved during the ship’s captains initial training prior to taking 
command.  
f. Coordination (External) 
Coordination (external) refers to the interoperability of the Navy. Specifically, it 
refers to the ability of the Navy to coordinate and work with NGOs, IGOs and other 
government agencies. Table 8 is a matrix for the problem of coordination (external) 
identified by the researcher through the lessons learned analysis. 
Table 8.   Coordination (External) Lessons Learned Grade Matrix 
 
(1) Problem Identification  
Coordination between the Navy and other agencies during recent HADR missions 
has been a common problem throughout most of the lessons learned. Specifically, the 
coordination between the Navy and USAID is the area of focus for most of the lessons 
learned. The reason for this lack of coordination stems mostly from the poor 
communications already discussed. However, culture has also played a part in preventing 
good coordination from happening.  
(2) Policy  
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (Joint Publication 3-29) (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2014) specifically gives detailed directions on interagency coordination by the DOD with 
other governmental agencies, NGOs and the host nation (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014).  
(3) Grade 
The researcher has assigned a grade of Yellow for the lack of coordination. 
However, there has been a dramatic improvement over the past decade.  
Lesson Learned Policy Litrature Review Interviews
Coordination External 
(Interoperability)
Joint Pub 3-0 Yellow Yellow
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(4) Recommendation  
The Navy has already made great strides to correct for this deficiency. The use of 
senior officers as liaison officers embedded with USAID to provide direct information 
sharing and planning coordination will ensure future HADR mission are more successful. 
However, this does not improve interoperability with NGOs or IGOs. For this the Navy 
should create a HADR mission website where all stakeholders can interact and 
communicate freely. Understanding the reluctance of some NGOs to be seen working 
with the military so as to be seen as independent and separate from the military is very 
important. Therefore, by using an online medium for the exchange of ideas and 
coordination of effort will allow for greater communication without violating their 
perceived independence.  
g. Planning 
Planning refers to the military’s adaptive planning and execution system (APEX) 
and the joint operation planning and execution system (JOPES). These systems are the 
process by which the GCC commander conducts planning for future operations. Table 9 
is a matrix for the problem of planning identified by the researcher through the lessons 
learned analysis. 
Table 9.   Planning Lessons Learned Grade Matrix 
 
 
(1) Problem Identification 
During Operation Unified Response the main cause of most lessons learned 
stemmed from a lack of having a JOPES plan in place. The GCC for the operation did not 
have an predetermined guide in place to deal with a contingency in Haiti. As a result of 
not having a plan to follow there was a disjointed approach to the operation. 
(2) Policy 
Lesson Learned Policy Litrature Review Interviews
Planning Joint Pub 5-0 yellow yellow
Joint Operation Planning (Joint Publication 5-0) is the policy that requires GCCs 
to prepare plans for potential future operations (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011a). Not having 
a response plan in place for a nation known to experience earthquakes and a government 
often weak and ineffectual is in direct violation of this policy.  
(3) Grade 
The researcher has assigned a grade of Yellow to this lesson learned due to the 
potential severity of mission failure.  
(4) Recommendation 
Planning for every potential event is beyond the ability of any agency. However, 
the GCCs should review the most likely scenarios to take place based on past experiences 
and probabilities. By doing so the GCCs can rank order the most likely events which 
have the greatest severity and prioritize them as needing fully established JOPES plans. 
Other less likely events can be required to have partial plans and the least likely events 
can be left up to the contingency planner once the event occurs.  
h. Operations 
Operations refer to the events carried out by the Navy during HADR missions. 
This includes the movement of naval assets into theater, the deployment of those assets 
once in theater and the conduct of the mission. Table 10 is a matrix for the problem of 
operations identified by the researcher through the lessons learned analysis. 
Table 10.   Operations Lessons Learned Grade Matrix 
 
(1) Problem Identification 
The researcher has found that once the Navy is tasked to conduct an HADR 
mission they operate in a very capable and efficient manner. They are mission goal 
oriented and are able to find solutions to extremely difficult problems. The one area 
Lesson Learned Policy Litrature Review Interviews
Operations Joint Pub 3-0 Green Green
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identified by all the interviews was the superior quality of professionalism and mission 
accomplishment they saw in the Navy. Despite the numerous obstacles it faces, the Navy 
is effective at getting the job done.  
(2) Policy 
The main policy which governs operations is the Joint Operations (Joint 
Publication 3-0) (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2008) however, the full scope of operations 
requires all joint publications be utilized.  
(3) Grade 
The researcher gave the grade of Green due to the Navy’s ability to conduct 
operations anywhere in the world under any conditions. 
(4) Recommendation 
The Navy should foster the culture which has led to this mindset that allows it to 
overcome all obstacles in their efforts to accomplish the mission. In addition the Navy 
should harness this culture for mission success and focus it toward improving the areas 
identified as needing attention to increase HADR mission effectiveness and success.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
The limitations of this project lie in the subjective grading factors that were 
applied to the lessons learned grade matrix. The subjective factors, which were applied to 
various characteristics of different problems, leave room for discrepancies. It is difficult 
to quantify how a color code grade is measured. Through the use of rigorous research, the 
author implemented a subjective weighting system to determine the potential result on 
future HADR missions.  However, there is still ambiguity in the grade determinations. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following are the findings and recommendations based on the conclusion of 
this research project. The findings and recommendations are based on the analysis of the 
interviews and lessons learned from recent HADR missions. 
1. Finding 
The USN has made vast improvements in its performance of HADR missions 
over the past decade. However, there is still room for additional improvements in the 
areas of communications, C2, level of knowledge, coordination and planning.  
2. Recommendation 
The analysis of the lessons learned from recent Navy HADR mission’s shows vast 
improvements have been made in the areas of logistics and operations. However, the 
lessons learned also show there is still room for additional improvements in the areas of 
communications, command and control, level of knowledge, coordination and planning. 
The recommendation of this research project, in order to see improvements in these areas, 
is for the Navy to increase the level of training for naval officers on the doctrine for 
HADR. This additional training can be made available in three phases.  
The first phase should be a part of the course work during the Naval War College 
JPME-1 class for junior officers. This training should be broadly focused on national and 
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strategic level decision making and more focused on operational and tactical HADR 
education. The emphasis for this phase should be placed on giving the officers a better 
understanding of the roles in HADR missions. The second phase should be during the 
Naval War College JPME-2 course work for senior officers. This training should cover 
specific national and strategic objectives of HADR and the doctrine which it guides. The 
emphasis here should be placed on preparing the officers for leadership roles in HADR 
missions. The final phase of training should be the Naval War College’s third 
professional military education course, Joint Force Maritime Component Commander 
and Combined Force Maritime Component Commander courses. These courses are held 
for the flag level officers and should cover the full spectrum HADR missions.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Limits to this research and its applicability indicate a number of areas in which 
further research is recommended, summarized in Table 11. 
Table 11.   Future Research Recommendations 
 
Conduct a more in-depth analysis of the benefits of the Navy's lessons learned website 
and how the improvements made to the logistics processes due to the lessons learned 
from the Haiti mission can be used on other problems. 
Conduct research into the training programs of JTF commanders to determine areas for 
improvement to ensure future HADR mission success. 
Conduct research into the communication issues preventing the Navy from being able to 
coordinate with other agencies. 
Conduct research into the JOPES planning process at the GCC to determine 
improvement in the HADR planning process. 
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APPENDIX A. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR HADR SUBJECT 
MATTER EXPERTS WITHIN THE COMBATANT COMMANDS 
7. List the Navy HADR instructions, policies and or procedures used during 
recent HADR missions. 
8. List the Navy HADR instructions, policies and or procedures NOT used 
during recent HADR missions. 
9. Describe actual procedures used during recent HADR missions. 
10. Did the combatant command conduct an after action report at the 
conclusion of the recent HADR event? 
11. Describe the lessons learned by the combatant command during the recent 
HADR event. 
12. Have the lessons learned and the results of the after action report been 
incorporated into instructions or training at the combatant command? 
13. What elements of a recent HADR mission proved to be successful or 
unsuccessful? 
14. Were the stated goals for the HADR mission met? 
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APPENDIX B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR HADR SUBJECT 
MATTER EXPERTS FROM USAID 
1. During a recent HADR event did USAID have any communication with 
the U.S. Navy? 
2. Did USAID seek out the support of the U.S. Navy during a recent HADR 
event? 
3. Did the U.S. Navy seek out USAID support during a recent HADR event? 
4. During a recent HADR event did USAID collaborate with the U.S. Navy? 
5. Did the collaboration with the Navy help advance your organization’s 
stated HADR goals? 
6. Did the Navy provide the agreed upon support? 
7. Did any problems arise with the collaboration? 
8. Were the U.S. Navy personnel properly trained to handle the HADR 
event? 
9. Given USAID stated goals for HADR events, describe ways the U.S 
Navy’s participation in a recent HADR event help to advance USAID 
goals? 
10. Describe ways the U.S. Navy could help advance USAID stated goals 
during future HADR events. 
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APPENDIX C. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR HADR SUBJECT 
MATTER EXPERTS FROM AN NGO 
1. During a recent HADR event did (NGO name here) have any 
communication with the U.S. Navy? 
2. Did (NGO name here) seek out the support of the U.S. Navy during a 
recent HADR event? 
3. Did the U.S. Navy seek out (NGO name here) support during a recent 
HADR event? 
4. During a recent HADR event did (NGO name here) collaborate with the 
U.S. Navy? 
5. Did the collaboration with the Navy help advance (NGO name here) stated 
HADR goals? 
6. Did the Navy provide the agreed upon support? 
7. Did any problems arise with the collaboration? 
8. Were the U.S. Navy personnel properly trained to handle the HADR 
event? 
9. Given (NGO name here) stated goals for HADR events, describe ways the 
U.S Navy’s participation in a recent HADR event help to advance (NGO 
name here) goals?  
10. Describe ways the U.S. Navy could help advance (NGO name here) stated 
goals during future HADR events. 
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